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Abstract
We consider a model of contagion in financial networks recently introduced in [1],
and we characterize the effect of a few features empirically observed in real networks
on the stability of the system. Notably, we consider the effect of heterogeneous degree
distributions, heterogeneous balance sheet size and degree correlations between banks.
We study the probability of contagion conditional on the failure of a random bank, the
most connected bank and the biggest bank, and we consider the effect of targeted poli-
cies aimed at increasing the capital requirements of a few banks with high connectivity
or big balance sheets. Networks with heterogeneous degree distributions are shown to
be more resilient to contagion triggered by the failure of a random bank, but more
fragile with respect to contagion triggered by the failure of highly connected nodes. A
power law distribution of balance sheet size is shown to induce an inefficient diversifi-
cation that makes the system more prone to contagion events. A targeted policy aimed
at reinforcing the stability of the biggest banks is shown to improve the stability of
the system in the regime of high average degree. Finally, disassortative mixing, such
as that observed in real banking networks, is shown to enhance the stability of the
system.
1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis, which began with the burst of the housing market bubble in the
U.S. and then propagated across different financial sectors all over the world [2], has high-
lighted the networked structure of the economic world. Contemporary finance is clearly
characterized by a high level of connectivity between financial institutions [3, 4, 5, 6]. In
stable market conditions such connections allow financial institutions (in this case banks)
to diversify their investment and to safely account for liquidity requests from their investors
without facing the risk of insolvency due to temporary shortage of liquid assets. The same
networked structure may, however, become a channel of contagion and stress amplification
when some institutions go bankrupt. In this case, banks linked to those that fail may be
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forced to revise the value of their assets and may face the risk of going bankrupt too.
One of the key problems in this context is that of understanding the role of the network
structure in relation to the contagion effect, and a growing part of the literature in the
field has been recently devoted to address this issue [1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. In particular,
we focus here on the attempt to model the propagation of failures in a financial system as
an epidemic spreading process in a network of interlinked balance-sheets [1, 7, 9]. With
this approach the assets of a bank correspond to the liabilities of other banks, and troubles
may arise if a bank goes bankrupt and is not able to pay back the loans obtained from
other banks. These are then forced to revise their balance sheets and may go bankrupt
if the amount of their assets becomes smaller than their liabilities. Starting from a small
number of failed banks, the aim is to characterize the probability that failures propagate
at the systemic level as a function of some relevant parameters, like the connectivity of the
network and the capital buffer of banks.
Here we consider the model introduced by Gai and Kapadia in [1]. They consider a
simple (yet rich) model of interlinked balance-sheets and study it with tools borrowed from
the theory of complex networks1. In the present paper we extend the analysis made in
[1] to account for properties empirically observed in real financial networks, notably het-
erogeneous degree distributions, heterogeneous assets distributions and degree correlations
among connected banks. Our major findings are:
• Heterogeneous networks are more robust with respect to the failure of random banks
but more fragile with respect to the failure of the most connected banks.
• A heterogeneous distribution of assets increases the probability of contagion even
with respect to random failures.
• Within the framework of the model a policy targeted to increase the capital buffer of
a few big banks can significantly reduce the contagion probability in highly connected
networks. In contrast, a policy targeted to increase the capital buffer of the most
connected banks is ineffective.
• Correlations, depending on their direction, can either decrease or increase the prob-
ability of contagion. The type of correlations observed in real networks actually act
to reduce contagion.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we review the main features of the
model introduced in [1]. We then consider the effect of heterogeneous degree distributions
in section 3, and the effect of having a power law distribution for balance sheet size in
1The model considered in [1] is actually a generalization of the model for cascades in random networks
introduced in [13].
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section 4. Finally, we consider in section 5 the effect of introducing correlations in the
system and provide a summary of our findings in the last section.
2 Review of the model
In this section we describe the model introduced in [1] and review its main features. The
model describes a system of N financial institutions (banks for brevity), each of them
representing a node of a random network. In this context, links mimic interbank exposures
and are therefore directed and weighted. Incoming links represent assets for a bank, while
outgoing links are liabilities, so that the interbank liabilities of a given bank correspond
to interbank assets for other banks. Each bank i is characterized by a balance sheet that
comprises interbank assets AIBi , interbank liabilities L
IB
i , deposits Di and illiquid assets
AMi . The condition for the bank to be solvent is therefore
(1− φ)AIBi + qAMi − LIBi −Di > 0, (1)
where φ represent the fraction of banks to which i is exposed that have defaulted and q
is the sale price of the illiquid assets. In the following we will assume for simplicity that
q = 1. In this case, the solvency condition can be expressed as
φ <
Ki
AIBi
, (2)
where Ki = A
IB
i +A
M
i − LIBi −Di is the bank’s capital buffer.
We are interested in understanding how the system responds to the bankruptcy of a
single bank, and in particular when this results in contagion events in which a finite fraction
of the banks are shut down. In [1], generating functions techniques are exploited to give an
analytical solution to the problem, and results from numerical simulations are presented as
well. The main results of [1] that are going to be relevant for this paper are the following
(see figure 1):
• As a function of the average connectivity, the system displays a window of connectiv-
ities for which the probability of contagion is finite. Links have a two-fold role in the
system: On one hand, they allow for contagion to spread across neighboring banks,
on the other hand they imply that risks can be shared by many banks.
• Increasing the capital buffer of banks reduces the contagion probability.
• When the system is very connected (i.e. when the average degree is high), the system
displays a robust yet fragile property. The probability of contagion is very low, but
in those instances where contagion happens the whole system is shut down.
3
In [1], numerical results are presented for the case of Erdo¨s-Renyi random graphs and
homogeneous distribution of assets. In this paper, we intend to investigate how different
topologies and different distributions of assets can affect the stability of the system. We
also study the effect of different policies aimed at enhancing the stability of the system.
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Figure 1: Contagion probability (circles) and conditional extent of contagion (squares) for Erdo¨s-Renyi
random graphs as a function of the average degree. Results refer to 1000 simulations of networks with
10, 000 nodes. Banks balance sheet comprise 20% of interbank assets, 4% of capital buffer, 76% of illiquid
assets, and we set q = 1. There is a window of connectivities with a finite probability of contagion.
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Figure 2: Blue circles: contagion probability for Erdo¨s-Renyi random netorks. Red squares: contagion
probability for scale free networks with γ = 3.0. Blue stars: extent of contagion for Erdo¨s-Renyi random
netorks. Red triangles: extent of contagion for scale free networks with γ = 3.0. Results refer to 1000
simulations of networks with 10000 nodes. Scale free networks appear to be more resilient to contagion.
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3 Heterogeneous degree distributions
Empirical evidence indicates that real financial networks exhibit heterogeneous degree dis-
tributions [3, 4, 5]. The number of connections varies considerably across banks, with a few
highly connected banks playing the role of hubs. To understand how this affects financial
stability we conducted numerical simulations of the above model using scale free networks,
i.e. networks with a power law distribution of in and out degrees: P (z) = z−γ . The distinc-
tive feature of a scale free network is the existence of nodes with very different degree, and
in particular the existence of hubs with a large number of connections, property that can
have a large impact on both static and dynamical properties of these systems[14, 15, 16, 17].
In this section we will discuss how a scale free degree distribution affects the stability prop-
erties of the model introduced in section 2. In this paper, unless otherwise stated, we will
consider balance sheets comprising 76% illiquid assets, 20% interbank assets and a capital
buffer Ki = 4% for all the banks. As in [1] the contagion probability is computed as the
fraction of runs for which more than 5% of banks are shut down because of the initial
failure of one single bank, and the extent of contagion is computed as the average fraction
of bankruptcies conditional on the fact that at least 5% of the system has been shut down.
These quantities are the result of 1000 runs, and are reported in figure 2, where we present
a comparison between Erdo¨s-Renyi and scale free networks for the case where a random
bank is initially shut down. The scale free topology enhances the stability of the system
as far as the contagion probability is concerned, but doesn’t significantly affect the extent
of contagion and the robust yet fragile nature of the system.
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Figure 3: Red squares: contagion probability for Erdo¨s-Renyi (red squares) and scale free (green circles)
networks with γ = 3.0 under random initial failure and for scale free networks conditional on the initial
failure of the highest connected node(blue triangles). Results refer to 1000 simulations of networks with
10000 nodes. On one hand scale free networks appear to be more resilient than Erodo¨s-Renyi if the seed is
chosen with uniform probability across nodes. On the other hand the probability of contagion in scale free
networks is much higher if the seed is the most connected node.
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Figure 4: Ratio between contagion probability in presence of a targeted policy where the capital buffer of
the 5% most connected banks is increased and the contagion probability in the case where the capital buffer of
5% random banks is increased for scale free random networks with γ = 3. Results refer to 1000 simulations
of networks with 10000 nodes. Such ratio oscillated around 1 signaling that, for the model we consider here,
a targeted policy is not effective.
In the complex networks literature it has typically been seen that scale free networks are
more robust than homogeneous ones with respect to random failures but more fragile in
the case of a targeted attack [15]. To test whether this is true here as well, we look at the
probability of contagion conditional on the initial failure of a high degree node. We con-
sider in particular the extreme case where the most connected node is selected to default.
Results are reported in figure 3, where we show that, as expected, scale free networks are
more unstable with respect to targeted failures. This is in agreement with similar results
obtained in [18] for the average extent of contagion. Again, as in the case of targeted attack
there is no large effect for the conditional extent of contagion.
The very fact that the probability of contagion for scale free networks is higher in the
case of a targeted failure seems to suggests that banks with a large number of connections
are of particular systemic importance. A natural question at this point is whether this fact
can be used to introduce a policy of targeted reserve requirements that increase systemic
stability. In other words, is it possible to decrease the probability of contagion by increasing
the capital buffer of a few selected nodes?
Within the context of the model discussed here this doesn’t seem to be the case. In
figure 4 we compare the probability of contagion for a system where we increased the capital
buffer to 6% of the 5% of nodes with highest degree. We compare this to a simulation where
we increased the capital buffer in the same way for 5% of banks chosen at random. As we
see from the plot the ratio of the two probabilities oscillates around 1, indicating that the
targeted policy is not effective.
This can be intuitively understood through the following argument: The weight of an
interbank claim associated with an incoming link is for each bank inversely proportional to
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Figure 5: Probability that the most connected bank is within the first 5% of failed banks for scale free
networks with γ = 3.0. The black line represents the reference level of 5%. Results refer to 1000 simulations
of networks with 1000 nodes. The bankruptcy of the most connected bank always happens after a substantial
number of other banks have already gone down.
its in-degree, since we assumed interbank assets to be equally distributed among neighbors.
This implies that the first banks to be affected by the initial random failures are going to
be poorly connected banks, for which the importance of a single link is higher, while
highly connected banks are going to be affected only at a later time. To confirm this
intuition, we computed the probability that, given the failure of the most connected bank,
such bankruptcy happens after at least 5% of the other banks have been shut down. In a
random setting, we would expect that the probability of going bankrupt within the first 5%
of banks is 5%. If, however, banks with high connectivity tend on average to go bankrupt
at a later stage, we expect the measured probability to be much lower than 5%, which is
clearly the case for the most connected node (see figure 5). Such behavior for threshold
models has already been observed within the context of public opinion formation in [19],
where it was shown that cascades of influence are not driven by a few very influential nodes,
but by a critical mass of influenced individuals.
Summarizing the results obtained in this section we can say that:
• Heterogeneous degree distributions decrease the probability of contagion triggered by
a random failure.
• Scale free networks are characterized by a few influential banks with a lot of con-
nections, and the probability of contagion conditional on the failure of one of these
influential nodes is higher than for homogeneous networks.
• Within the context of the present model, a targeted policy where the capital buffer
of a few (< 5%) banks is increased is not enough to further diminish the probability
of contagion.
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• Although the probability of contagion is tamed by a heterogenous degree distribution,
the conditional extent of contagion (i.e. the fraction of failed banks in those cases
where at least 5% of the system has gone down) is not significantly different with
respect to the case of a homogeneous degree distribution. In particular, the robust
yet fragile behavior highlighted in [1] is preserved.
4 Heterogeneous distribution of assets
In the previous section we considered networks made of interlinked balance sheets with
heterogeneous connectivities. Another important source of heterogeneity that has been
empirically observed is that bank balance sheets are highly non-uniform, and appear to
follow a power law distribution [5]. In this section we will focus on this property with the
aim of understanding how this affects the stability of the system.
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Figure 6: Red circles: contagion probability for Erdo¨s-Renyi random graphs with uniform asset distribution.
Blue squares: contagion probability for Erdo¨s-Renyi random graphs with power law asset distribution under
random initial failure. Green triangles: contagion probability for Erdo¨s-Renyi random graphs with power law
asset distribution conditional on the initial failure of the bank with the biggest balance sheet. Results refer to
1000 simulations of networks with 1000 nodes. The inefficient diversification induced by the heterogeneous
asset distribution widens the contagion window. The situation is even worse when we consider the contagion
probability conditional on the failure of the biggest bank.
We consider a network of banks where the assets A of a given bank are drawn from a
distribution of the form P (A) ∝ A−α. As before 20% of these assets are in the form of
interbank claims, but these assets are now distributed among in-neighbors according to the
amount of assets held by neighboring banks. In this way we enforce, on average, a fixed
ratio of the total amount of interbank assets and liabilities. The important difference with
8
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
average degree
ra
nd
om
 v
s 
ta
rg
et
ed
 p
ol
ic
y
Figure 7: Ratio between the contagion probability when the capital buffer of random banks is increased
vs. when the capital buffer of the 5% biggest banks is increased, assuming Erdo¨s-Renyi random networks.
Results are based on 10, 000 different simulations of networks with 1000 nodes each. The targeted policy is
quite effective when average degree is large, where the probability of contagion can be reduced by more than
50%.
respect to the case of where all banks have the same assets is that the bank is not uniformly
exposed to the failure of its neighbors. The result of this redistribution of exposures can
be deleterious: a bank that would have been stable with respect to the failure of one
neighbor in the case of uniform exposures can now go bankrupt if the wrong neighbor goes
down. In other words a non uniform distribution of exposures implies less effective risk
diversification, and we expect the probability of contagion to be affected.
This intuition is confirmed by the numerical simulations shown in figure 6, where we
show results obtained for the case α = 2.5 in Erdo¨s-Renyi random networks. We observe
that the contagion window is wider in the case of a power law distribution of assets than
it is for a uniform distribution of assets. The inefficient allocation of exposures is high-
lighted if we consider the probability of contagion conditional on the fact that the biggest
bank goes bankrupt (see figure 6). As for the case of heterogenous degree distributions,
we can ask whether the fact that a few big banks exist could be used to reduce the overall
systemic risk through a policy of targeted reserve requirements. We then consider the
situation where we increased to 6% the capital buffer of 5% banks with the highest balance
sheet size. The results are reported in figure 7, where we compare this policy of targeted
reserve requirement with a policy where we increased the capital buffer of 5% of the banks
chosen at random. We observe that, at least for high average degrees, a targeted policy
can further reduce the contagion probability by more than 50%. This can actually be quite
relevant if we think that this is the region where the robust yet fragile nature of the system
is displayed, so that any contagion event can result in a failure of the whole system.
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Figure 8: Red circles: contagion probability conditional on the initial failure of the most connected bank.
Blue squares: contagion probability conditional on the initial failure of the bank with biggest balance sheet.
Green triangles: conditional extent of contagion associated to the initial failure of the most connected bank.
Black stars: conditional extent of contagion associated to the initial failure of the biggest bank. Results
refer to simulations of 10, 000 different networks with 1000 nodes each. For low average connectivity the
contagion probability is more dependent on connectivity than size. For high average degree the opposite
is true: the contagion probability conditional on the failure of the biggest bank is much higher than the
contagion probability conditional on the failure of the most connected bank. No difference is seen for the
corresponding extent of contagion.
A topic of active discussion in recent years is whether institutions are of systemic
importance because they are “too big to fail” or because they are “to interconnected to fail”
[20]. We address this question here by considering a network with power law distributions
of both balance sheet size and degree and looking at what happens when the biggest vs
the most connected bank fails. In order to distinguish the effects of size and connectivity
we built the financial network without correlations between degree and size of banks (in
other words the biggest bank is not necessary going to be the most connected).
Results are reported in figure 8. We observe that the two properties dominate in
different regimes. For low average degree the probability of contagion due to the failure
of the most connected bank is higher than that due to the failure of the biggest one. For
higher values of the degree, however, the opposite is true: size is actually more relevant
than connectivity in terms of probability of contagion. Given that real networks appear to
be in the region with high average connectivity, and that we showed that this is the regime
where a policy of increasing the capital requirement of the biggest banks works, this would
suggest that size is more important to reduce the probability of contagion.
In summary we can say that:
• A power law distribution of balance sheet size induces a finite probability of contagion
over a wider range of average connectivities than a uniform distribution.
• A targeted policy where the capital requirement of biggest banks increases can be
used to reduce the contagion probability in the regime of high average degree.
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• The average degree of the network determines whether size or connectivity is more
important. When the degree is low the most connected banks are more important,
but when the degree is high the size of a bank becomes more important. Since real
networks are in the high degree realm, this suggests that a ”too big to fail policy” is
more relevant.
• The conditional extent of contagion is not significantly affected by heterogenous assets
distributions.
5 Correlated financial networks
In the previous sections we focused on the effect of heterogeneity on the stability of the
system. In this section we instead explore the effect of correlations between neighboring
banks. A property of real financial networks that has been empirically observed is the fact
that banks with a few connections tend to form links with highly connected banks. This
property, known as disassortative mixing, is actually common for technological networks,
while the opposite is usually true for social networks [15].
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Figure 9: Blue circles: contagion probability for uncorrelated networks. Red squares: contagion probability
for disassortative networks. Blue triangles:conditional extent of contagion for uncorrelated networks. Red
stars: conditional extent of contagion for disassortative networks. Results refer to 1000 simulations of
networks with 10000 nodes. The contagion window is smaller in the case of disassortative networks, but the
conditional extent of contagion is always high in for high average degree.
We want to understand the impact of disassortativity on the stability of the system.
Since we would like to disentangle the effect of heterogeneity in the degree distribution from
that of degree correlations, we consider here the case of homogeneous random graphs with
correlations among degrees. Such networks have been generated starting with Erdo¨s-Renyi
11
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Figure 10: Blue circles: contagion probability for uncorrelated networks. Red squares: contagion proba-
bility for disassortative networks. Green triangles: contagion probability for assortative networks. Results
refer to simulations of 1000 different networks each with 10, 000 nodes. Positive correlations among degrees
widen the contagion window.
random graphs and then applying the rewiring method introduced in [21]. The method is
essentially a Monte Carlo algorithm where the cost function to minimize is
H(G) =
J
2
∑
i,j
ai,jkikj , (3)
where ai,j = 1 if banks i and j are connected and ai,j = 0 otherwise, and J is a constant that
can be used to tune the level of assortativity: With J < 0 we will obtain a disassortative
network, with J > 0 an assortative network, and with J = 0 an uncorrelated network.
In figure 9 we show the probability and extent of contagion for the case of disassortative
(J = −1) and uncorrelated (J = 0) Erdo¨s-Renyi random graphs. We observe that such
correlations tend to reduce the window where the probability of a systemic event is finite.
This reduced probability of contagion induced by disassortativity can be intuitively under-
stood through the following reasoning: In a disassortative network less connected nodes
have a tendency to be connected with higher connected nodes. Since higher connected
nodes are the most robust, with this network configuration higher connected nodes act as
a screen reducing the failure probability of less connected nodes. The opposite is true for
assortative networks. Indeed in this case weak nodes (i.e. poorly connected ones) tend to
be connected among themselves, and the window of contagion is wider, as shown in figure
10.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered a model of financial contagion recently introduced in [1],
and we have studied how the stability of the system is affected by features empirically
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observed in real networks. In particular we have considered the effect of power law distri-
butions in degree and balance sheet size, and correlations in degree. The stability of the
system has been tested according to different failure protocols,namely, initial failure of a
random bank, initial failure of the most connected bank, and initial failure of the bank
with the biggest balance sheet.
In our numerical simulations we observe that a scale free network topology decreases
the probability that a random failure can trigger a series of cascades affecting a finite frac-
tion of the system. However, the contagion probability conditional on the initial failure
of the most connected bank is significantly increased. This is because a system with scale
free topology is characterized by a few hubs and many less connected nodes. The failure of
a hub potentially has an impact on many other nodes. However, in the case of the failure
of a random bank, the probability that the selected bank is a hub is quite small. The
fact that a few banks have a high impact on the stability of system might suggest that
a policy where the capital buffer of those banks is increased might enhance the stability
of the system. In the framework of the model here considered, however, such a policy is
ineffective in the case of cascades triggered by the initial failure of less connected banks.
This is because highly connected banks have more means of risk diversification, so that
they fail only after a larger number of other banks have already gone down.
Another realistic feature we incorporated in the model is a power law distribution for
the size of bank balance sheets. Our numerical experiments reveal an increased window of
contagion with respect to the case of homogeneous sizes. This can be traced back to the
fact that banks are not uniformly exposed to their counterparty. The situation is clearly
worse if we consider the probability of contagion triggered by the failure of the biggest
bank, since the big banks represent the highest source of exposure for their creditors. At
odds with the case of a scale free degree distribution, however, a targeted policy where the
capital buffer of a few big banks is increased can significantly reduce the contagion prob-
ability, at least in the region of high average degree. This is particularly important since
this is exactly the region where the system displays robust yet fragile behavior, meaning
that if contagion happens the whole system will go down.
A comparison between the “too big to fail” and the “too interconnected to fail” point
of views was done by comparing the probability of contagion conditional on the failure of
the most connected vs the biggest bank for a system with power law degree distributions
of connectivity vs. asset size. The failure of highly connected banks has a stronger impact
for networks with low average degree, while the failure of large banks has more effect for
networks with high average degree. This, combined with the previous results on the effect
of targeted policies, suggests that the “too big too fail” approach is more effective, at least
in the framework of this model.
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Finally we took a look at the effect of introducing correlations into financial network.
We found that the type of degree correlations observed in real financial networks tend to
reduce the probability of contagion.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. 0965673
and 1005075 and by the Sloan Foundation under the Grant “Network Models of Sys-
temic Risk”. The authors would like to thank Pierpaolo Vivo for a careful reading of the
manuscript.
References
[1] P. Gai and S. Kapadia, “Contagion in financial networks,” Proc. R. Soc. A, vol. 466,
no. 2120, pp. 2401–2423, 2010.
[2] M. G. Crouhy, R. A. Jarrow, and S. M. Turnbull, “The subprime credit crisis of 2007,”
The Journal of Derivatives, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 81–110, 2008.
[3] C. Iazzetta and M. Manna, “The topology of the interbank market: developments in
italy since 1990,” Banca d’Italia Working paper, no. 711, 2009.
[4] G. Iori, G. D. Masi, O. V. Precup, G. Gabbi, and G. Caldarelli, “A network analysis
of the italian overnight money market,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 259–278, 2008.
[5] M. Boss, H. Elsinger, M. Summer, and S. Thurner, “The network topology of the
interbank market,” Quantitative Finance, no. 4, p. 677, 2005.
[6] E. B. e Santos and R. Cont, “The brazilian interbank network structure and systemic
risk,” Working Papers Series 219, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department, Oct.
2010.
[7] E. Nier, J. Yang, T. Yorulmazer, and A. Alentorn, “Network models and financial
stability,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 2033–2060,
2007.
[8] C. Cornand and G. Moysan, “Unstable financial networks,” available at
ssrn.com/abstract=1494233, 2009.
[9] A. G. Haldane and R. M. May, “Systemic risk in banking ecosystems,” Nature, no. 469,
pp. 351–355, 2011.
14
[10] H. Amini, R. Cont, and A. Minca, “Resilience to contagion in financial networks,”
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865997, 2010.
[11] F. Allen and D. Gale, “Financial contagion,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108,
pp. 1–33, February 2001.
[12] C.-P. Georg, “The effect of the interbank network structure on contagion and financial
stability,” Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 12-2010, Friedrich-Schiller-
University Jena, Oct. 2010.
[13] D. Watts, “A simple model of global cascades on random networks,” PNAS, no. 99,
pp. 5766–5771, 2002.
[14] S. N. Dorogovtsev, A. V. Goltsev, and J. F. F. Mendes, “Critical phenomena in
complex networks,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 80, pp. 1275–1335, Oct 2008.
[15] R. Albert and A.-L. Baraba´si, “Statistical mechanics of complex networks,” Rev. Mod.
Phys., vol. 74, pp. 47–97, 2002.
[16] G. Bianconi, “Mean field solution of the ising model on a Baraba´si-Albert network,”
Phys. Lett. A, vol. 303, pp. 166–168, 2002.
[17] F. Caccioli and L. Dall’Asta, “Non-equilibrium mean-field theories on scale-free net-
works,” J. Stat. Mech., p. P10004, 2009.
[18] X. Chen and A. Ghate, “Financial contagion on power law networks,” Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1751143, 2011.
[19] D. J. Watts and P. S. Dodds, “Influentials, networks, and public opinion formation,”
Journal of Consumer Research: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 441–
458, 2007.
[20] Int. Monetary Fund, “Global financial stability report,” tech. rep., 2009.
[21] J. D. Noh, “Percolation transition in networks with degree-degree correlation,” Phys.
Rev. E, vol. 76, p. 026116, Aug 2007.
15
